We analyze the cosmological role of terminal vacua in the string theory landscape, and point out that existing work on this topic makes very strong assumptions about the properties of the terminal vacua. We explore the implications of relaxing these assumptions (by including "arrival" as well as "departure" terminals) and demonstrate that the results in earlier work are highly sensitive to their assumption of no arrival terminals. We use our discussion to make some general points about tuning and initial conditions in cosmology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cosmology seeks to provide a history of our universe, describing the dynamical evolution from its initial state to the world we observe today. The question of fine tuning of initial conditions in cosmology was one of the original motivations for cosmic inflation theory [1] , and it remains a difficult problem [2] . Thanks to our everyday experience with the 2nd law of thermodynamics, it seems very natural to accept initial conditions that have low entropy. However, low entropy initial conditions are necessarily fine tuned. In this paper we make some specific points about how tuning assumptions can slip in essentially unnoticed into cosmological discussions.
One challenging related issue is the possibility that our observations do not result from a natural cosmological evolution but instead are the result of a thermal (or other) fluctuation. The observations of this fluctuationbased observer (or "Boltzmann Brain" [3] ) need not reflect the universe or its physical laws. Cosmological theories which predict we are more likely to be these Boltzmann Brains instead of "normal" observers are unsatisfactory and such a prediction is usually considered grounds for rejection of the theory in question.
In an eternally inflating multiverse in a landscape there are many different types of vacua with different physics. Throughout the history of this "multiverse" transitions among these different vacua will take place, typically via bubble transitions which form "pocket universes" in the new vacuum. According to standard treatments 1 , a landscape with only vacua with positive cosmological constants (de Sitter-like vacua) would reach an equilibrium fixed point regardless of initial conditions. This equilibrium would be dominated by Boltzmann Brain observers.
Linde [4] has shown how the presence of "terminal" vacua (Anti-de Sitter-like vacua which collapse to a singularity) can help in the discussion of Boltzmann Brains, and Bousso et al. [5, 6] and Harlow et al. [7] have taken this further, showing that introducing "terminal" vacua 1 See [2] for an alternative can remove the problematic equilibrium fixed point. A terminal vacuum will crunch to a singularity in a finite time and thus no longer participate in any further transitions. If the rate of tunneling out of a vacuum that supports normal observers to terminals is significantly greater than the rate for producing Boltzmann Brains, the Boltzmann Brain problem would be resolved. Furthermore, the state of the universe will approach a special steady state that is determined by the values of the various tunneling rates.
Many assumptions about the nature of terminals and the initial state of the universe have gone into this description. These assumptions can be explored by taking a closer look at how the terminals are described: A bubble with negative cosmological constant will crunch at a rate faster than an unlikely up-tunneling which is why transitions out of terminals are typically not considered. In addition the physics of the Anti-de Sitter (AdS) pocket universe as it nears a singularity is not well understood, so one could not even apply something like Coleman-de Luccia tunneling rates as one approaches the singularity. But if we believe that physics is fundamentally unitary one could still consider the time reverse of the AdS crunch. Such evolution should describe an allowed process in the theory, and the time reversed picture could be extended further to describe tunneling from AdS out into another vacuum. In this paper we refer to the usual terminals considered in [4] [5] [6] [7] as "departure terminals", and the time reverse of these (which can describe transitions from AdS to dS vacua) as "arrival terminals". Terminals with zero vacuum energy which evolve asymptotically to Minkowski space at late times were also considered in [7] (following [8] these are called "hats"). Our arguments about allowing time reversed behavior also apply to hat-type terminals (in this case the arrival terminals would correspond to special states coming in from infinitely early times and ultimately tunneling to a different vacuum state). For the purposes of our discussion we lump these hats (and their time reverse) together with the AdS terminals. While the special assumptions and properties of the AdS crunch discussed here do look very different from the asymptotic Minkowski behaviors in the zero vacuum energy, they can still be lumped together to make our main points.
If the theory is truly unitary, all possible initial states should be allowed, including ones with arrival terminals popping in at any time. Thus the complete absence of arrival terminals in the analysis in [7] is equivalent to a very special assumption about "initial conditions". We put "initial conditions" in quotes to acknowledge that the complicated dynamics we are contemplating for "beyond the AdS crunch" are unlikely to lend themselves to a simple initial time slice picture for the entire system. But still, the presence or absence of various arrival terminals certainly counts as the technical equivalent to assumptions about initial conditions.
In this paper we show that the special steady state attractor found in [7] depends heavily on their choice of an arrival-free state. The steady state found in [7] is a feature put in "by hand" via the choice of initial state, rather than a feature determined intrinsically by the tunneling FIG. 1. The tree like structure represents a discrete model of eternal inflation like the one presented in [7] . The tree follows the causal future of an inflating bubble with time flowing from left to right. Branching of the tree represents the exponential expansion of de Sitter space as well as bubble nucleation, with separated branches falling out of causal contact. Terminal vacua are marked with an X, where we no longer follow their evolution once they have crunched.
rates alone, as it might first appear. We demonstrate this by making different assumptions about arrival terminals in a simple toy model and show that these lead to different steady state attractors. Thus we disagree with the claim in [7] that their attractor "depends on the existence of an initial condition but not on its details" 2 . The topics of equilibrium and the arrow of time are closely tied to our discussion. Without any terminals, the system is understood to reach equilibrium (maximum entropy) which means that the arrow of time only appears as a transient, before the equilibrium sets in. It is the equilibrium behavior that leads to the Boltzmann Brain problem. In the picture with only departure terminals proposed in [7] the system does exhibit an arrow of time, and would never reach equilibrium. The reason for this behavior is the specially tuned choice of initial state (specifically, the assumption that arrival terminals are absent for all eternity). In this respect the arrow of
We modify the tree model shown in Fig. 1 by allowing arrival terminals represented by 's. For unitary theories such arrival terminals represent allowed processes, and the choice to exclude them is effectively a choice about initial conditions. time identified in [7] originates in the usual way, as the result of a special choice of low entropy initial conditions (see [2, 9, 10] for discussions of this point in the context of cosmology). This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the standard formalism used in earlier work to analyze the no-arrivals case, and then extends that formalism to include arrival terminals. Section III applies the formalism to a toy model, and demonstrates the dependence of the steady state attractor on the assumptions about arrival terminals. Section IV develops our discussion of the toy model further, presenting specific solutions that illustrate our main point. We also summarize our main points and conclusions in Sect. IV.
II. TRANSITION RATES AND STEADY STATES A. No arrival terminals
This section reviews the formalism developed in [11] (and utilized in [5] [6] [7] ) as applied only to departure terminals. One can define a dimensionless transition rate from vacuum j to vacuum i, as
Where Γ ij is the bubble nucleation rate per physical volume for bubbles of type i in bubbles of type j. Here H j is the expansion rate of bubble j. The Γ ij 's could be given by the Coleman-de Luccia tunneling rates in the thin wall approximation but their exact form isn't important for this discussion.
In the absence of arrival terminals, in a particular measure we can define probabilities from the fraction of comoving volume occupied by vacuum i, f i . Since we are interested in observers that form in a space with a positive cosmological constant, we will only keep track of volume fractions that correspond to de Sitter-like vacua (which are non-terminal). The equation that describes how these volume fractions evolve with time is given by:
The quantity κ i is defined to be the total transition rate out vacuum i which includes rates to transition into other de Sitter type vacua, κ ji and rates to transition to departure terminals, κ D i . Since these equations do not keep track of the volume fraction that is lost to departure terminals, f would have to be renormalized to define a probability.
This equation can be rewritten using a matrix, M :
Solutions to this are of the form:
where −q l are the eigenvalues of M and s l i are the corresponding eigenvectors. Since the f i 's as we have defined them do not include terminal vacua there is an effective leak of volume fraction. This property and the assumption that each de Sitter vacuum is accessible from each other in one or more transitions result in all eigenvalues being negative and non-zero. The least negative eigenvalue is non-degenerate(shown in the appendix of [11] ), which is called the dominant eigenvalue. The dominant eigenvalue (along with the corresponding eigenvector) will dominate late time behavior. We denote the dominant eigenvector/eigenvalue without the l superscript and write our late time solution as:
This attractor solution is seen in [7] as giving rise to an emergent arrow of time, as probability flows trough the dominant steady state given by q and out into the departure terminals.
B. Adding arrival terminals
We now extend the above formalism to include arrival terminals. The timescale for tunneling out of an AdS terminal vacuum before it has crunched is much longer than the timescale for nearing the singularity and approaching (poorly understood) Planck scale physics. Transitions of the sort which could be described with the typical Coleman de-Luccia rates would be highly sub-dominant. Here we focus on allowing transitions that are simply the time reverse of departure terminal crunches (in the AdS case, or alternatively the time reverse of "hats" in the zero vacuum energy case). We do not presume to understand these processes at a technical level (since we don't have a detailed theory of the crunch) but we expect such processes to be allowed if the theory is unitary.
To allow transitions from "arrival terminals" we introduce an additional term in Eqn. 2 to get:
The quantity f A (t) could be interpreted as something like a comoving volume fraction for the arrival terminals in which case κ A i would be like a rate to transition from arrival terminal to vacuum i. We will not force this interpretation and simply leave κ The function f A (t) could in principle be anything due to our lack of knowledge of the physics of AdS vacua once they have crunched, and similar open questions about "incoming hats". We just consider a simple case where in some sense the arrival terminal vacua are being depleted as transitions occur. We will characterize this depletion with a simple decaying exponential with some time constant, R:
We emphasize that this approach does not consider a fully generic initial state, but just one that is a bit more generic than one gets by assuming no arrivals at all. This choice is meant to easily fit methods of previous work while demonstrating our main point (the sensitivity of the steady state to choices about initial conditions). In the general case one would not expect to even have an arrow of time or a steady state, but our modifications are not sufficiently general to demonstrate that aspect. In that sense our modification keeps the "temporal provincialism" [12] exhibited in [7] .
III. TOY MODEL
To make our main points we now apply our formalism to a simple toy model. Our toy model landscape has three de-Sitter vacua and two anti de-Sitter vacua very similar to the case considered in [6] . The potential for this landscape is shown in Fig. 3 . The original purpose of this toy landscape was to show how terminal vacua could resolve Boltzmann Brain problems in certain cases by producing an attractor solution with the right properties. We will show that allowing arrival terminals can change the properties of the attractor solution, and can thus reintroduce the Boltzmann Brain problem depending on the specific choices made about arrivals. Starting with the case of departure terminals but no arrival terminals, Eq. 5 is:
Since in this model we have assumed vacuum 1 has a much lower Λ than vacuum 2, the probability of up tunneling from vacuum 1 to 2 is much lower than the total decay rate out of 1.
To first order in , the dominant eigenvalue (Q) and eigenstate s are give by
For convenience, the dominant eigenvector, s is normalized such that the entry for the longest lived vacuum is unity. Now let's modify this to include arrival terminals. For simplicity we will only allow arrival terminals to tunnel into vacua 1 and 3. The solution given by using Eqns. 14 in Eqn. 7 will now be the homogeneous solution to Eqn. 2. Including the contributions from arrival terminals will give the general solution:
where C is an arbitrary constant determined by initial conditions and b is an overall normalization factor. In the case where R << q, the second term in the equation will dominate at late times. The ratio of volume fractions are then strongly governed by the arrival rates.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The inclusion of arrival terminals can dramatically change the evolution of the multiverse. It can change the steady state attractor that emerges or even eliminate such attractor behavior altogether. And allowing arrival terminals can significantly modify the probability of forming Boltzmann Brains. Our toy model is adapted from [6] , where it is assumed that vacuum 3 is the only vacuum capable of supporting any type of observer. Comparing the probability of ordinary observers to Boltzmann Brain observers is done using the dominant eigenvector (or dominant history) method, which evaluates the relative abundance of Boltzmann Brains vs. legitimate observers in the steady state which emerges after an initial transient.
In the previous section we showed that with arrival terminals the dominant eigenvector would be heavily dependent on the arrival rates. While we do not have a formalism like the Coleman-De Luccia tunneling rates to characterize the arrival rates, one still cannot make them disappear without effectively making an assumption about initial conditions.
To give a concrete illustration on how the dominant eigenvector can be affected, we numerically solved Eqn. 8 for some arbitrarily chosen transition rates that are characteristic of our toy model: 
We considered the case where the arrival rates are exactly zero and compared to the case where they are nonzero (specific values are given in the caption to Fig. 4) . From the resulting volume fractions shown in Fig. 4 we can see for initial conditions that differ only on the treatment of arrival terminals, the dominant eigenvector achieved in the two scenarios are different. Without knowledge of what the arrival rates should be, we are unable to make predictions on the dominant eigenvector which prevents us from making predictions of the latetime behavior of the theory.
Our experience with a strongly expressed 2nd law (and the associated low entropy past) in the world around us can make it seem very natural to assume similar properties must be true in the general cosmological case (a phenomenon aptly dubbed "temporal provincialism" in [12] ). When exploring the fundamental origins of the arrow of time in the universe one must take great care to avoid, or at least clearly identify the extent to which we are allowing a temporally provincial perspective. We argue that the intuition that one is free to exclude arrival terminals in landscape cosmologies, even while allowing departure terminals, is an example of this temporally provincial phenomenon. This conclusion does not detract from important points made in [6, 7] . Those papers show the significant implications of imposing the (highly tuned) condition that arrival terminals are absent, while departure terminals are allowed. In particular, they show how adding only the departure terminals can eliminate the Boltzmann Brain problem in models which would otherwise have one.
While we have focused our comments on [6, 7] , our points are relevant more generally, as reviewed in [2] . For example in [13] , the presence of an arrow of time is deeply dependent on one's willingness to accept the assumption that the time reverse of their tunneling process out of the background de Sitter space is entirely absent. The de Sitter equilibrium model [2] (which has many similarities with the model presented in [13] ) is very different in this regard, since as a fundamentally equilibrium model the time reverse of all processes are included, and their rates are given by the detailed balance property of equilibrium systems.
The origin of the thermodynamic arrow of time is a very important and puzzling aspect of cosmology. There appear to be only two ways to incorporate it in our theories: One can put the arrow of time in by hand, and accept the finely tuned initial conditions this approach requires, or consider an equilibrium model which requires exotic dynamics to avoid the Boltzmann Brian problem [2] . Our familiarity with a world that strongly exhibits an arrow of time can make it easy to overlook the strong assumptions that go into the first approach. In this paper we carefully analyze the tuning that appears in [6, 7] via the the assumed absence of arrival terminals. While the authors of [6, 7] understand this tuning and embrace it for the purposes of that work 3 , we still find it useful to call out these aspects more explicitly than has been done in those papers. We feel the sort of analysis presented here is helpful in clarifying our thinking about the arrow of time in cosmology, and may lead us ultimately to a more satisfactory understanding. 
